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The United States Supreme Court has vacillated over the 
years in its fidelity to the doctrine of standing, but as of late is 
quite strict in enforcing this prerequisite to stating a justiciable 
claim.1 For half a century, however, the Supreme Court has 
reduced the rigor of its standing requirements when the claim on  
 
* R.B. Price Professor and Isabelle Wade & Paul C. Lyda Professor of Law, 
University of Missouri. 
 1. Standing is a doctrine of justiciability derived from the “Cases” and 
“Controversies” provision in Article III of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. III, 
§ 2, cl. 1. The doctrine has three requirements:  individualized injury, a causal 
link between the alleged wrongdoing and the injury, and the matter is 
redressable by traditional judicial remedies.  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 
U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). For a survey of the Court’s cases on standing that cycle 
from strict to lax in adherence to doctrine, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Limiting 
Article III Standing to “Accidental” Plaintiffs: Lessons from Environmental and 
Animal Law Cases, 45 GA. L. REV. 1, 26–49 (2010). 
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the merits arises under the Establishment Clause.2 There are 
two types of these reduced-rigor cases. The first type has drawn 
the most attention. It involves taxpayer standing where a 
plaintiff challenges the use of government resources said to 
improperly advance religion. The second type of reduced-rigor 
standing is where a claim is brought because of a plaintiff’s 
“unwanted exposure” to religious expression by government.3 The 
Supreme Court has sharply narrowed but not entirely done away 
with taxpayer standing. Not so with unwanted-exposure 
standing. The latter remains a common feature of contemporary 
litigation under the Establishment Clause and warrants closer 
examination. 
As will be shown in Part I of this article, taxpayer standing is 
presently permitted only when tax monies have been extracted 
from a plaintiff and appropriated by a legislature as funding for a 
statutory program that expressly contemplates the use of the 
money for religion. It is thought that only in this circumstance 
can it plausibly be said that a taxpayer-plaintiff suffered injury 
in that she was coerced into contributing her money in aid of 
religion. 
Part II takes up the Supreme Court’s reduced-rigor standing 
when a plaintiff objects because she is personally exposed to a 
religious symbol or other religious expression attributable to the 
government. Typical of such cases is where the government has 
sponsored a public prayer, or constructed on public land a  
 2. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. 1. 
 3. Some refer to this reduced-rigor standing as “offended observer” cases. 
This is a mistake. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Nonestablishment, Standing, and 
the Soft Constitution, 85 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 407, 439–40 (2011) (noting others 
have used the term “offended observer,” but acknowledging that an atheist 
caused to “feel like ‘an outsider’” is distinguishable from an injury-by-exposure 
bystander). As shown below, the nature of the relevant harm is not emotional or 
psychological offense, nor is it the intensity of the offense. See, infra, notes 105–
06, 108, 119–20, and accompanying text. Further, the successful plaintiff is 
more than a mere observer, but one who disagrees with her government’s 
message. See, infra, notes 107–10, 124–25, and accompanying text. The term 
“offended observer” is a way for the governmental defendant to belittle these 
Establishment Clause claims and thereby gain a rhetorical advantage in an 
effort to have them dismissed at the outset for lack of standing. 
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Christian cross or monument to the Ten Commandments. These 
unwanted-exposure cases have been consistent over the last 
sixty-six years in allowing standing where a plaintiff’s status as 
student, government official, juror, or the like has resulted in 
personal exposure to the government’s religious message with 
which she disagrees. Being a mere witness to unconstitutional 
behavior by one’s government is not normally sufficient to vest a 
person with standing to sue.4 So, for example, observing the 
municipal police search a neighbor’s home in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment does not vest one with standing to sue.  The 
injury one experiences as a result of such police action is a 
generalized grievance shared by everyone in the municipality, 
and thus not one personalized as required for standing. But 
government-expression cases involving governmental displays of 
religion are treated differently.  Just how it is that this “injury” 
of unwanted exposure to a religious message is not a grievance 
we all share when our government operates outside of its 
constitutional restraints will require some explaining by the 
Supreme Court. What the Court has to say on that matter will 
also tell us something about the unique operation of the 
Establishment Clause. 
Part III of this article utilizes the factual record in Salazar v. 
Buono5 to illustrate some of the subtle features of unwanted-
exposure standing, and to test its boundaries. Finally, Part IV 
frontally takes-up what it is about the operation and meaning of 
the Establishment Clause that is unique. Because the Court 
employs the no-establishment principle much like a structural 
clause separating church and state, that boundary can be 
transgressed without anyone having suffered individualized 
injury-in-fact. That in turn has led the Supreme Court to respond 
by adopting these specialized rules of reduced-rigor standing. 
 4. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984) (“Recognition of 
standing in such circumstances would transform the federal courts into no more 
than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned 
bystanders.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 5. 559 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (plurality op.). 
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The Supreme Court’s long-standing rule is to disallow 
taxpayer standing.6 A taxpayer as plaintiff simply lacks the 
individualized injury to have a personal stake in the outcome of 
the litigation.7 In Flast v. Cohen,8 the Supreme Court rather 
dramatically introduced a test for determining when a departure 
from the long-standing rule would be permitted and taxpayer 
standing allowed.9 The double-nexus test generated in Flast was 
framed with sufficient generality to permit taxpayers to 
challenge a range of state and federal appropriations and tax 
expenditures. Nevertheless, in no instance since Flast has 
taxpayer standing ever been permitted except when the claim on 
the merits alleged a violation of the Establishment Clause.10 
This narrowing of taxpayer standing to only cases invoking 
the requirement of church-state separation should have 
redoubled efforts by the Supreme Court to explain what is unique 
about the Establishment Clause such that taxpayer-plaintiffs 
 6. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (decided along with 
Massachusetts v. Mellon). Of course, the rule does not apply to situations where 
the taxpayer-plaintiff is suing because she is due a tax refund or because she is 
the victim of an illegal tax. In such instances the taxpayer has individualized 
injury. 
 7. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 343 (2006) (rejecting the 
notion that an allegedly improper legislative appropriation increased the 
plaintiff’s burden of taxation as little more than a remote and indeterminate 
claim to an interest in the moneys of the U.S. Treasury that is shared by 
millions). 
 8. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Flast held that federal taxpayers had standing to 
challenge provisions of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 
providing federal aid for educational equipment, as well as for classes in 
reading and arithmetic, to nonpublic schools most of which were religious 
schools. The case was then remanded to the trial court for consideration of the 
merits with respect to the Establishment Clause. 
 9. The Court in Flast said that to have standing a taxpayer must show 
two things. “First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link between the status 
and the type of legislative enactment attacked. . . . Secondly, the taxpayer must 
establish a nexus between the status and the precise nature of the 
constitutional infringement alleged.” Id. at 102. 
 10. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 347–49 (2006) (denying 
taxpayer standing in suit alleging a rights violation under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause); see Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 
609–10 (2007) (plurality op.). 
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receive preferred treatment in lawsuits that normally would be 
dismissed as lacking individualized injury and, hence, no 
standing.11 While that has not happened,12 standing in Flast 
recently came under serious challenge in Hein v. Freedom From 
Religion Foundation, Inc.13 The Hein plurality held that taxpayer 
standing did not extend to a general appropriation by Congress 
to fund the day-to-day operations of the Executive Office of the 
President, especially where the executive had broad discretion as 
to how those funds were spent in furtherance of the President’s 
policy initiatives.14 The plurality framed the issue of executive 
discretion as a concern for separation of powers—the judiciary 
not trenching upon the authority of the President—being equal to 
if not prior to any concern that the President was using his 
spending authority to improperly advance religion.15 In addition 
 11. Flast did reference back to James Madison and defeat of the religious 
assessment bill in Virginia during 1784–1785. 392 U.S. at 103–04.  But there 
was no attempt in Flast to tailor taxpayer standing to the facts as they 
happened in Virginia, detail as to how the objectionable assessment bill would 
have operated, and Madison’s precise arguments for opposing the assessment 
bill. 
 12. Between Flast and Hein, two Supreme Court cases examined 
assertions of taxpayer standing where the underlying claim on the merits was 
brought under the Establishment Clause. The results were mixed. One case 
found taxpayer standing and the other did not. In Valley Forge Christian 
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 
(1982), the Court held that taxpayers lacked standing to challenge a decision by 
a federal executive agency to declare certain government-owned real estate as 
surplus and then transfer the real estate free of charge under the Property 
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, to a Christian college.  Valley Forge, 454 
U.S. at 466–69.  Flast permitted taxpayer standing only when the taxpayer-
plaintiff was challenging Congress’s use of its Taxing and Spending Power, U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 478–82.  In Bowen v. Kendrick, 
487 U.S. 589 (1988), the Court held that taxpayer-plaintiffs had standing to 
challenge a congressional social service program that provided grant funding to 
counseling centers promoting teen chastity, expressly requiring that religious 
as well as secular centers be considered. Id. at 618–20. The Court went on to 
uphold the constitutionality of the program on its face, but remanded for 
further proceedings with respect to “as applied” challenges. Id. at 600–18, 620–
22. 
 13. 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (plurality op.). 
 14. Id. at 609–14. 
 15. Id. at 611–12; see id. at 615–18 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasizing 
separation of powers); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. 
Ct. 1138, 1146–47 (2013) (emphasizing the origin of standing doctrine in 
separation of powers). 
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to not wanting the Judicial Branch to oversee discretionary 
spending by the Executive Branch, the Hein plurality insisted 
that taxpayer standing be allowed only when the legislative 
program in question expressly contemplated that the 
appropriated monies would go to religion.16 But Hein did little to 
add to our knowledge of why taxpayer standing was ever proper 
and thus how it is that the Establishment Clause could be 
violated in the absence of a plaintiff with individualized injury.  
In particular, Hein made no attempt to identify the sort of 
specialized harms that were protected by the Establishment 
Clause such that a specialized rule of taxpayer standing was 
justified. 
The circle connecting reduced-rigor taxpayer standing with 
James Madison and the history of Virginia’s disestablishment, 
events which were in turn connected with the role of the 
Establishment Clause in separating church and state, was finally 
completed in the case of Arizona Christian School Tuition 
Organization v. Winn.17 The Court in Winn denied taxpayer 
standing to challenge a recently adopted provision in Arizona’s 
income tax law that provided credits to taxpayers making 
charitable contributions to nonprofit corporations organized for 
the purpose of awarding scholarships to K-12 students attending 
private schools, including religious schools. For purposes of 
taxpayer standing, Winn said that a taxpayer’s injury remediable 
under the Establishment Clause must entail the “extraction and 
spending of tax money in aid of religion.”18 This limitation on the 
nature of the taxpayer-plaintiff’s injury or personalized harm 
was attributable to the origin of the Establishment Clause in the 
work of James Madison and his Memorial and Remonstrance, a 
protest petition circulated in Virginia during the summer and 
early fall of 1785 in opposition to a bill in the state legislature 
proposing a religious assessment for the support of Christian 
clergy.19 As the Memorial makes clear, for Madison it was not the  
 16. Hein, 551 U.S. at 603–09 (plurality op.). 
 17. 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011). 
 18. Id. at 1446 (quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
 19. A full account of the historical events contributing to disestablishment 
in Virginia appears in Carl H. Esbeck, Protestant Dissent and the Virginia 
Disestablishment, 1776–1786, 7 GEO. J. OF L. & PUB. POLICY 51 (2009) 
[hereinafter Esbeck, Protestant Dissent]. This includes a detailed parsing of 





amount of the tax, a levy which he opposed even if the 
assessment were “three pence only.”20 Rather than the dollar 
amount of the pecuniary harm, for Madison the relevant injury 
was that the religious tax payments were coerced and thus 
contrary to a principle called voluntaryism.21 For Madison, as 
well as for the Baptists and Presbyterians who joined him in 
opposing the Virginia assessment bill,22 as a matter of religious 
belief any contribution or tithe to one’s church must be voluntary. 
It made no difference to Madison that the Virginia bill permitted 
each taxpayer to designate the church of his choice to receive his 
tax allotment via the county collector. The tax was still coercive. 
As Winn explained, because the history of this no-establishment 
principle limited claims by taxpayer-plaintiffs to coercive 
extractions of their money to be applied in aid of religion, 
taxpayer standing had to be denied on the facts in Winn. The 
Arizona tax credit did not involve the extraction of tax money  
Madison’s arguments in his Memorial and Remonstrance. Id. at 82–85, 92–98. 
 20. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1446 (“In Madison’s view, government should not 
‘force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of 
any one establishment.’” (quoting 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 186 (G. 
Hunt ed. 1901)). 
 21. Id. (“In the Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison objected to the 
proposed assessment on the ground that it would coerce a form of religious 
devotion in violation of conscience.”). 
 22. Giving to one’s church was seen as an act of religious devotion. 
Baptists in particular, but other Christians as well, believed such giving must 
be voluntary. Esbeck, Protestant Dissent, supra note 19, at 96. Baptists and 
other dissenters in Virginia were an essential base of political support for 
James Madison. CHRIS DEROSE, FOUNDING RIVALS:  MADISON VS. MONROE, THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS, AND THE ELECTION THAT SAVED A NATION (2011). Religious 
dissenters first worked in support of Madison in April 1785 to re-elect him as a 
delegate to the Virginia legislature. Id. at 102–03 (the pending legislative issue 
being the Virginia religious assessment bill). In June 1788, when ratification of 
the federal Constitution was being debated in Virginia, Madison defended the 
document as not delegating power to the federal government to interfere with 
religion, work that favorably influenced the Baptists in the February 1789 
election. Id. at 189–90, 226–27. Baptists, Lutherans, and other dissenters voted 
heavily for Madison in the election of February 1789, sending him to Congress 
where he led the effort to report out a Bill of Rights. Id. at 226–30, 238–40, 246–
49, 258. 
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from the plaintiffs who filed the lawsuit. Nor was the earning of a 
tax credit by a charitable contributor an act of legislative 
spending in aid of religion.23 Hence, there was no constitutionally 
cognizable injury in the sense contemplated by the principle of 
voluntaryism. 
Winn also indicated that “extraction” and “spending” must 
both be present to make sense of taxpayer standing, just as both 
were present in the defeated Virginia assessment bill. This goes 
to causation, an additional requirement for standing. A taxpayer-
plaintiff’s tax monies must be traceable through the general 
treasury before being spent on religion or a religious 
organization. Only when there is such a causal link can it be said 
that there is coercion of the taxpayer-plaintiff to aid religion. The 
plaintiffs in Winn could not, of course, trace their tax payments 
to the religious schools.24 
The third requirement for standing is redressability. A 
taxpayer-plaintiff’s injury—a transgression of the principle of 
voluntaryism—is not redressable by an injunction against a 
legislative appropriation to the religious schools in question. As 
Winn pointed out, there were no such appropriations in Arizona 
to enjoin.25 
From an economic perspective the distinction between a tax 
credit and an appropriation is a matter of mere form.  Both 
deplete the state treasury.26 From the perspective of the 
Establishment Clause, however, the plaintiffs who sued as 
taxpayers failed to suffer religious coercion in the sense of 
transgressing the principle of voluntaryism. And such coercion is  
 23. Winn, 563 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1446–47. 
 24. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1447–48 (Taxpayer plaintiffs “cannot satisfy 
the requirements of causation and redressability. When the government collects 
and spends taxpayer money, governmental choices are responsible for the 
transfer of wealth. In that case a resulting subsidy of religious activity is, for 
purposes of Flast, traceable to the government’s expenditures. And an 
injunction against those expenditures would address the objections of 
conscience raised by taxpayer-plaintiffs.”). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1447 (“It is easy to see that tax credits and 
governmental expenditures can have similar economic consequences, at least 
for beneficiaries whose tax liability is sufficiently large to take full advantage of 
the credit.”). 
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the personalized harm protected by the Establishment Clause, at 
least as illustrated by the 1785 Virginia assessment experience. 
That is the historical experience the Supreme Court deemed 
relevant and that Winn read into the Establishment Clause.27 
Notwithstanding this confining of Flast to Madison and the 
Virginia disestablishment experience, taxpayer standing after 
Winn is still reduced-rigor standing. It is still a stretch to 
characterize as “coercive” and thus a personalized harm, the 
payment by a plaintiff of a general federal tax into the U.S. 
Treasury, where the money is commingled with monies from 
millions of other sources, and then appropriated by Congress in 
aid of a program that expressly designates some or all of the 
allotted money to religion. And tracing the causal link between 
the points at which a plaintiff initially pays her general federal 
tax and the time at which Congress appropriates funds from the 
U.S. Treasury to religion is an abstraction. Indeed, the latter 
moment in time would likely not be known to the taxpayer-
plaintiff, which is to say the plaintiff would not even know when 
the relevant injury befell her. Accordingly, Winn is still not fully 
exacting when it comes to traditional standing doctrine. 
In two respects caution should be exercised so as not to over-
read Winn. First, Winn does not conflate the test for taxpayer 
standing with the merits of a prima facie claim under the 
Establishment Clause. Even if a taxpayer-plaintiff satisfies the 
standing requirements of Winn, she may lose on the merits 
because the program of governmental aid satisfies the 
requirements of religious neutrality. Religious neutrality is 
where the government enacts a program of aid that: (i) has a  
 27. There remains one difference between the Virginia religious 
assessment bill, opposed by Madison in 1784–1785, and the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965, at issue in Flast. The Virginia proposal was a 
special tax ear-marked for religion. When collected, the funds were kept 
separated by the county collector. The money was kept separate because in time 
it was paid over to each church according to each taxpayer’s designation. Flast 
involved a general federal tax where the proceeds went to the general U.S. 
Treasury. So the causal link between extracting and spending begins to 
breakdown. But Flast was a case where it was known that the tax revenues 
appropriated under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 were 
to be paid to religious schools. This was because in 1965 nearly all nonpublic 
schools were religious schools. Hein, 551 U.S. at 604 n. 3. 
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secular purpose; (ii) the recipients are eligible without regard to 
religion; and (iii) administrative care is taken so that public 
funds are not diverted to an explicitly religious purpose.28 In this 
manner, a government’s program of aid to assist private-sector 
providers of education, health care, and social services, has been 
upheld in the face of Establishment Clause challenges.29 
Second, Winn does not mean that all successful claims under 
the Establishment Clause require a showing of coercion 
(identified in Winn with the principle of voluntaryism).  In many 
instances a plaintiff can prevail in an Establishment Clause case 
without showing religious coercion.30 All that Winn stands for is 
that an assertion of taxpayer standing requires the proper 
showing of coercion. But that narrowing in Winn is quite enough 
such that there will be a decline in the successful use of taxpayer 
standing. 
II.  UNWANTED-EXPOSURE STANDING 
Unlike the recent narrowing of taxpayer standing, the 
Supreme Court’s cases on unwanted-exposure standing have  
 28. When it comes to programs of direct financial aid, the Establishment 
Clause requires only that the three elements set forth in the text be satisfied. 
These neutrality principles were first clearly adopted by the Court in Agostini v. 
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (upholding federal program of special education 
services when students at religious and public schools are treated equally). See 
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality op.) (upholding federal 
program providing aid to K-12 education, treating religious and public schools 
equally). Where the aid to religion is indirect, such as via a parental voucher or 
tax deduction, the neutrality principle has been the law much longer. See, e.g., 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (school vouchers); Mueller v. 
Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (income tax deduction for parents of children 
attending schools, including religious schools). 
 29. See, e.g., Freedom From Religion Found. v. McCallum, 214 F. Supp. 2d 
905 (W.D. Wis. 2002), aff’d 324 F. 3d 880 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
Establishment Clause did not prevent direct state aid to faith-intensive drug 
treatment center where a choice of secular and religious programs was 
available to addicts without regard to the religious character of the programs). 
 30. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 221–23 (1963) (Free 
Exercise Clause claim is predicated on a showing of coercion, whereas a claim 
under the Establishment Clause need not be so attended); Engel v. Vitale, 370 
U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (same; noting that voluntariness of student prayer may 
defeat a free-exercise claim but not a violation of the no-establishment 
principle). 
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drawn little attention and remain fairly expansive. Typical of 
such cases is where the government places a Christmas crèche on 
the courthouse lawn or Congress inserts “under God” into the 
nation’s Pledge of Allegiance. The mere observance of 
unconstitutional behavior by one’s government does not vest an 
individual with standing to sue. For example, should a public 
school student observe a fellow student being expelled for 
misconduct without notice or opportunity for a hearing, she 
cannot sue having witnessed the Due Process Clause violation. 
Certain church-state cases, however, have proven to be different. 
Reduced rigor in the required injury-in-fact for standing has 
been permitted in cases challenging religious symbols or other 
religious speech attributable to government.31 These unwanted-
exposure cases occur when the underlying claim on the merits is 
that the Establishment Clause is violated because the 
government has taken sides in a religious matter. Such a 
violation can occur and yet no one suffers a personalized harm or 
injury. Unwanted exposure is a proxy for the missing injury-in-
fact, thus allowing the courts to proceed to adjudicate the claim 
on the merits. A plaintiff alleging a violation of church-state 
boundaries can have unwanted-exposure standing if: (i) she 
objects because government is siding with a religion other than 
her own; (ii) she objects because government is siding with a 
religion and she subscribes to no religion; or (iii) she objects 
because government is siding with a religion that is hers but that 
the sponsorship is actually harmful to her religion. This third 
option can be conceptually difficult; but with a little reflection 
one can see how, given the nature of religion, government efforts 
to advance a particular religion often have a corrupting effect. 
Several of James Madison’s arguments in his Memorial and  
 31. These cases are limited to those involving religious symbols, spoken 
words, written words, or other speech attributable to the government. A mere 
act of the government alleged to imply a “message” to third-party observers 
about the government’s position on a matter is insufficient. In re Navy 
Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756, 764–65 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (claim by non-liturgical 
Protestant chaplains that others like them were discriminated against in 
Navy’s retirement program could not assert their standing to sue based on 
exposure to unwanted “message” alleged to be communicated to them by 
discrimination against their fellow chaplains). 
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Remonstrance were about how religious establishment is actually 
harmful to religion.32 
It is normal for the government to takes sides on all sorts of 
issues, including controversial ones. Government has that power. 
But government does not have the power to take sides on a 
religious question.33 The latter is prohibited by the 
Establishment Clause.34 This specialized treatment of religious 
disputes thereby calls for a specialized rule of standing if the 
objecting party is going to be able to lodge a claim under the 
 32. Esbeck, Protestant Dissent, supra note 19, at 83–84, 92–97. For 
historical arguments by James Madison concerning how establishment 
corrupted Christianity and the church, see id. at 92–94 nn.164–65, 167–76. For 
religious arguments by Madison concerning how no-establishment benefits 
churches and religion, see id. at 94–96 nn.178–82, 184, 187–90. For prudential 
arguments by Madison concerning the dangers of establishment, see id. at 97 
nn.191–96. 
 33. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 845–46 (1995) 
(university regulations that “required public officials to scan and interpret 
student publications to discern their underlying philosophic assumptions 
respecting religious theory and belief” was inconsistent with the Establishment 
Clause); Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (“The government may 
not . . . lend its power to one or the other side in controversies over religious 
authority or dogma.”); id. at 887 (“Judging the centrality of different religious 
practices is akin to the unacceptable business of evaluating the relative merits 
of differing religious claims. . . . Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we 
have warned that courts must not presume to determine the place of a 
particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim.”) (internal 
citations omitted); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269–72 nn. 6, 9 and 11 
(1981) (government must avoid inquiring into the significance of certain words, 
practices, and events to differing religious faiths); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 
92-93 (1976) (while government may speak out on controversial public issues, it 
must remain neutral in religious disputes); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (1 Wall.) 
679, 727 (1871) (there is no civil court jurisdiction to resolve disputes over 
religious doctrine, polity, or church discipline). 
 34. That government does not have the power to take sides on a religious 
question or dispute is a particular application of a more general rule. The rule is 
that no-establishment is best achieved to the degree that modern government 
uses its considerable powers to minimize its impact on religion. This not only 
helps to prevent the corruption of religion by the state, but prevents the 
oppression of personal choice in religious matters which can exacerbate division 
within the body politic along religious lines. See Douglas Laycock, Formal, 
Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 
993, 1001 (1990); see also Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out 
Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 38 (2000); Andrew Koppelman, And I Don’t Care 
What It Is: Religious Neutrality in American Law, 39 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1115, 
1116, 1120, 1128–29 (2013). 
2013]  Establishment Clause Standing  
619 
Establishment Clause. This is because when government takes 
sides in a religious matter there is often no one with a 
personalized injury. Consider the nontheist who when using U.S. 
coins and paper money observes the engraving “In God We 
Trust.” The putative injury is similar to a generalized grievance 
that we all share when our government fails to operate within its 
constitutional restraints. As a proxy for personalized injury the 
Supreme Court seized upon unwanted exposure, and in this way 
ensures that the plaintiff would have the necessary incentive to 
vigorously pursue the legal and factual presentation of the 
dispute in an adversarial setting. 
The United States Supreme Court’s cases that invoke the 
Establishment Clause and claim unwanted exposure to 
government religious speech are fairly numerous—sixteen. 
However, in nearly all of these cases—twelve out of the sixteen—
the plaintiff’s standing was not challenged by the government 
and thus was not argued by counsel and decided by the Supreme 
Court.  These twelve cases, therefore, are not binding precedent 
when it comes to what is required to bring an unwanted-exposure 
case as a proxy for traditional standing.35 But the twelve are 
illustrative of the many ways these exposure cases arise. The 
four remaining cases do address unwanted-exposure standing 
and are sufficient to suggest broader principles. For the 
presentation to be complete, all sixteen cases are reviewed below 
in chronological order. 
The first case of interest is McCollum v. Board of 
Education.36 McCollum invalidated a local public school’s 
program which allowed nearby churches to hold elective religion 
classes in classrooms during regular school hours. The plaintiff 
was a resident and taxpayer of the local school district, and “a 
parent whose child was then enrolled in the Champaign public 
schools.”37  A parent has standing in her capacity as a parent for  
 35. Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. 
Ct. 1436, 1448–49 (2011) (pointing to several cases which held that where lack 
of standing was not raised on appeal, then the case is of no precedential value 
on that point). 
 36. 333 U.S. 203 (1948). In McCollum, the Supreme Court for the first time 
found an Establishment Clause violation. 
 37. Id. at 205. The description of plaintiff as a school district taxpayer is a 
matter relevant to taxpayer standing but not unwanted-exposure standing. In a 




the injury caused by the unwanted exposure to her minor 
children. Hence, the child need not be a party. Relevant to the 
unwanted exposure of the plaintiff’s child to the religion classes, 
the Court said: 
The operation of the State’s compulsory education system thus 
assists and is integrated with the program of religious 
instruction carried on by separate religious sects. Pupils 
compelled by law to go to school for secular education are 
released in part from their legal duty upon the condition that 
they attend the religious classes.38 
The government’s challenge to plaintiff’s standing was 
rejected without analysis in a single sentence: “A second ground 
for the motion to dismiss is that the appellant lacks standing to 
maintain the action, a ground which is also without merit.”39 
Plaintiff was not personally exposed to what was taught in the 
religion classes, nor was her child.40 If a parent did not give 
permission for her child to attend one of the religion class, the 
child was “not released from public school duties; they were  
concurring opinion Justice Jackson added that plaintiff was an atheist. Id. at 
234. 
 38. Id. at 209. 
 39. Id. at 206 (citing “Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 443, 445, 464.”). 
Coleman v. Miller addressed the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review a 
lawsuit by Kansas legislators who had cast a vote against ratification of a 
proposed amendment to the federal Constitution. They claimed that their vote 
as state legislators was not properly counted by Kansas officials and that the 
ratification should be deemed defeated—rather than passed, as reported to 
Congress by Kansas officials. To that extent the legislators’ claim of interest 
was different from that of a mere citizen of Kansas, they were found to have 
standing. 307 U.S. at 443, 445. We do not have a clear explanation of Coleman’s 
applicability to the question of standing in McCollum. 
 40. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 205, 209–10, 212 (1948). In a 
concurring opinion Justice Jackson expands on this point.  He rejects standing 
based on plaintiff’s school-age child being an observer of the release-time class 
but not subject to coercion to attend one of them. Id. at 232. Jackson goes on to 
write that to the extent that other students “join and he does not, it sets him 
apart as a dissenter, which is humiliating,” that emotion cannot confer 
standing. “Even admitting this to be true, it may be doubted whether the 
Constitution which, of course, protects the right to dissent, can be construed 
also to protect one from the embarrassment that always attends nonconformity 
whether in religion, politics, behavior or dress.” Id. at 232–33. 
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required to leave their classrooms and go to some other place in 
the school building for pursuit of their secular studies.”41 In this 
manner the compulsory education law was seen by the Court as 
holding non-attending students on campus pursuing their 
educational duties. The other students—those attending a 
religion class—were characterized as being released from their 
compulsory education requirement. As the Court saw it, standing 
was predicated on the local school’s enforcement of the 
compulsory education law in a manner favoring religion. 
Although the plaintiff’s child was not personally exposed to the 
religion classes, the child did have to assume a special duty to 
avoid such unwanted exposure—namely, remaining fully under 
the compulsory education law while his classmates enjoyed 
release time. On the merits, the on-campus release-time program 
was found to be in violation of the Establishment Clause. 
The plaintiff in Doremus v. Board of Education42 challenged 
teacher-led devotional Bible reading in New Jersey public 
schools. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits. The father 
of a student subject to the unwanted exercise had brought the 
suit, but his child subsequently graduated and thus the claim for 
prospective relief was mooted.43 
Engel v. Vitale44 was a challenge to a statewide program of 
daily voluntary classroom prayer in the New York public schools. 
The plaintiffs were “parents of ten pupils insisting that use of 
this official prayer in the public schools was contrary to the 
beliefs, religion, or religious practices of both themselves and 
their children.”45 The government did not challenge the standing 
of the plaintiffs. That is surprising because the objecting parents 
and their school-age children could opt-out of the prayer 
exercise.46 Because of the opt-out, the plaintiffs’ children could 
have avoided the prayer albeit undertaking some inconvenience  
 41. Id. at 209. 
 42. 342 U.S. 429 (1952). 
 43. Id. at 432–33. Doremus was also a case where standing was sought on 
the basis of plaintiff being a taxpayer. That too was unsuccessful. Id. at 433–35. 
 44. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 45. Id. at 423. 
 46. Id. at 423 n. 2. 
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to do so. On the merits, the classroom prayer was found to violate 
the Establishment Clause. 
The fact that the “observance on the part of the students is 
voluntary,” however, did not entirely escape the Court’s notice.47 
The prayer being voluntary would make a difference under the 
Free Exercise Clause, explained the Court, where coercion is an 
essential element of the prima facie claim.48 But with respect to 
the Establishment Clause, coercion or compulsory exposure to 
the prayer need not be shown. This is because one of the objects 
of the modern Establishment Clause is to separate church and 
state so as to prevent injury to either or both,49 as distinct from 
personal religious harm. 
School District of Abington Township v. Schempp50 involved 
consolidated cases from Philadelphia and Baltimore, both 
challenging daily classroom prayer and devotional Bible reading 
in public schools. In both instances, the religious exercises were 
optional.51 In the Philadelphia case, the plaintiffs were: 
Edward Lewis Schempp, his wife Sidney, and their children, 
Roger and Donna [are] members of the Unitarian Church in 
Germantown, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where they . . . 
regularly attend religious services. . . .  The children attend the 
Abington Senior High School, which is a public school operated 
by appellant district.52 
Also, “Edward Schempp and the children testified as to specific 
religious doctrines purveyed by a literal reading of the Bible 
‘which were contrary to the religious beliefs which they held and 
to their familial teaching.’”53 
In the Baltimore case, the plaintiffs were “Mrs. Madelyn 
Murray and her son, William J. Murray III, . . . both professed  
 
 47. Id. at 430. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 431–33. For more discussion concerning the unique nature of the 
Establishment Clause, see, infra, Part IV. 
 50. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
 51. Id. at 224–25. 
 52. Id. at 206. 
 53. Id. at 208. 
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atheists.”54 The “petition particularized the [Murrays’] atheistic 
beliefs and stated that the [school] rule, as practiced, violated 
their rights ‘in that it threatens their religious liberty by placing 
a premium on belief as against non-belief and subjects their 
freedom of conscience to the rule of the majority.’”55 
Having in mind that the exercises were voluntary, the lack of 
standing to challenge the religious practices under the 
Establishment Clause was raised by the government.56 The Court 
disagreed and reasoned that plaintiffs had standing as follows: 
[T]he requirements for standing to challenge state action under 
the Establishment Clause, unlike those relating to the Free 
Exercise Clause, do not include proof that particular religious 
freedom are infringed. . . . The parties here are school children 
and their parents, who are directly affected by the laws and 
practices against which their complaints are directed. These 
interests surely suffice to give the parties standing to 
complain.57 
Schempp cited to all three prior cases.58 Certainly the students in 
Engel and Doremus were directly exposed to the unwanted 
expression, whereas the student in McCollum had to forego 
release from compulsory education to avoid unwanted exposure. 
What was characterized in Schempp as “directly affected” by the 
unconstitutional practices of the government was deemed by the 
Court as sufficient injury for purposes of standing. 
As in Engel, the Schempp Court said that it was unconcerned 
that plaintiffs did not prove they were victims of the 
government’s coercion.59 Coercion is an element of a Free 
Exercise Clause claim which is rights-based, but compulsion is 
not required to state a claim under the Establishment Clause. 
This is because the Establishment Clause is about policing the 
boundary between church and state. “[T]he Court found that the  
 54. Id. at 211. 
 55. Id. at 212. 
 56. Id. at 224 n. 9. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. Doremus never reached the issue of unwanted-exposure standing 
because the case had become moot. 
 59. Id. at 221, 223; see, supra, note 30. 
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‘first and most immediate purpose [of the Establishment Clause] 
rested on the belief that a union of government and religion 
tends to destroy government and to degrade religion.’”60 
Obviously that boundary can be crossed without there being any 
victims with coercive injury. If there are no victims of coercion, 
then there is no one with traditional standing to sue. In 
Schempp, no one had traditional standing so the Court supplied 
standing by the proxy of unwanted exposure. 
 Chamberlin v. Dade County Board of Public Instruction61 
summarily struck down prayer and devotional Bible reading in 
the Dade County, Florida, public school district. The plaintiffs 
were parents of school-aged children enrolled in junior high and 
elementary schools in Dade County.62 The plaintiffs’ standing to 
raise an unwanted-exposure claim was not challenged before the 
Supreme Court, but standing would seem to follow from Engel 
and Schempp. 
Stone v. Graham63 struck down a state law requiring the 
posting of the Ten Commandments in all public school 
classrooms in Kentucky. The plaintiffs described themselves “as 
a Quaker, a Unitarian, a non-believer, a mother of school age 
children and public school teacher, two children of compulsory 
school age attending public schools, a Jewish Rabbi, and as 
taxpayers.”64 Plaintiffs’ standing to raise an unwanted-exposure 
claim was not challenged before the Supreme Court, but once 
again standing would follow from Engel and Schempp. 
Marsh v. Chambers65 upheld a state legislature’s practice of 
hiring a chaplain to offer a prayer at the beginning of each day 
when the legislature is in session. The plaintiff was described as 
“a member of the Nebraska Legislature.”66 The Court noted that  
 60. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 221. 
 61. 377 U.S. 402 (1964) (per curiam). 
 62. Chamberlin v. Dade Cnty. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 160 So.2d 97, 98 
(Fla. 1964). 
 63. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam). 
 64. Stone v. Graham, 599 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Ky. 1980). Being a local 
taxpayer is relevant to taxpayer standing, but not to unwanted-exposure 
standing. 
 65. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 66. Id. at 785. 
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the plaintiff “claiming injury by the practice is an adult, 
presumably not readily susceptible to ‘religious indoctrination,’ or 
peer pressure.”67 While the government had challenged the 
plaintiff’s standing in the federal circuit court,68 it did not again 
press the issue before the Supreme Court.69 Although standing 
was thus conceded, the Supreme Court volunteered the following: 
“[W]e agree that Chambers, as a member of the legislature . . . 
has standing to assert this claim.”70 Accordingly, by dictum we 
know that a person vested with the status of a legislator and 
regularly in the legislative chamber when the voluntary prayer 
takes place was sufficient proxy to have standing in this 
unwanted-exposure case. 
Lynch v. Donnelly71 upheld a municipal practice of displaying 
a nativity scene of Mary, Joseph, and the Christ child as part of a 
larger Christmas holiday scene in a private park. The display 
was located in the heart of the Pawtucket, Rhode Island, 
shopping district.72 The plaintiffs were described as Pawtucket 
“residents and individual members of the Rhode Island affiliate 
of the American Civil Liberties Union, and the affiliate itself.”73 
The Court’s majority opinion does not discuss standing, thus it 
appears the government did not challenge plaintiffs’ unwanted-
exposure injury as giving rise to standing. If standing had been 
challenged, the argument would be that plaintiffs were citizens of 
Pawtucket and that was material to their standing, that is, 
plaintiffs’ municipal citizenship led to their exposure to the 
display. As municipal citizens, plaintiffs held a status that made 
their unwanted exposure not only likely, but also conflicted in the 
sense that their government was seen as taking sides against 
them on a religious matter. The unwanted exposure was a proxy 
for the injury-in-fact required of traditional standing. On the 
merits, the city’s maintenance of the nativity scene was found not  
 67. Id. at 792. 
 68. Id. at 785. 
 69. Id. at 786 n. 4. 
 70. Id. He was also described as a state taxpayer, a matter relevant to 
taxpayer standing but not unwanted-exposure standing. 
 71. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 72. Id. at 671. 
 73. Id. 
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to violate the Establishment Clause. 
In a now prominent concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor first stated her “endorsement or disapproval” test. Her 
test identifies an injury that is personal to certain plaintiffs that 
the Establishment Clause is said to prevent, namely that the 
Establishment Clause provides a remedy for the political 
alienation that minorities suffer when one’s government takes a 
position on a religious matter.74 Justice O’Connor goes on with 
what in her view is the two-part nature of the relevant injury: 
One is excessive entanglement with religious institutions, 
which may interfere with the independence of the institutions, 
give the institutions access to government or governmental 
powers not fully shared by nonadherents of the religion, and 
foster the creation of political constituencies defined along 
religious lines. The second and more direct infringement is 
government endorsement or disapproval of religion.  
Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are 
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, 
favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends 
the opposite message.75 
The “endorsement” test was thought to have possibilities for 
characterizing an injury that flows from one’s status as a 
municipal citizen when the church-state matter at issue is 
unwanted exposure to a government’s religious expression. The 
injury, writes Justice O’Connor, is in being an “outsider” to the 
body politic defined by a dominant or majority religion.76 The 
injury of “political outsider” has some likeness to the unwanted-
exposure incurred by a citizen when her government takes a 
contrary view on a religious matter. Such an injury was earlier 
discussed as: (i) that of a religious person whose government  
 74. Id. at 692; see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67 (1985) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (In describing the harm Justice O’Connor used language like 
“sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of 
the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they 
are insiders” and making “religion relevant to a person’s standing in the 
political community.” Id. at 69.). 
 75. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687–88. 
 76. Id. 
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sides with another religion; (ii) that of a nonreligious person 
whose government sides with a religion; or (iii) the injury of a 
religious person whose religion is harmed by too close an 
embrace by the government.77 But Justice O’Connor fails to 
explain by reference to history or otherwise why political 
alienation is singled-out as the relevant injury. She does not say 
why only religious minorities are injured. She does not say why 
mere disagreement with the religious position taken by one’s 
government is not sufficient harm. 
Wallace v. Jaffree78 struck down a state law requiring that 
public schools begin the school day with a moment of silence by 
students for prayer or meditation. The law was found to have a 
religious purpose.79 The plaintiff challenging the law was a 
parent who sued on behalf of “three of his minor children; two of 
them were second-grade students and the third was then in 
kindergarten.”80 Plaintiff’s standing to challenge the state law 
was not objected to by the government. However, standing would 
seem to necessarily follow from Engel and Schempp. 
Edwards v. Aguillard81 struck down a state law requiring 
public school science classes to teach creationism whenever 
evolution is taught. The law was found to have a religious 
purpose.82  The plaintiffs challenging the law “included parents of 
children attending Louisiana public schools, Louisiana teachers, 
and religious leaders.”83 The Court went on to observe: 
Families entrust public schools with the education of their 
children, but condition their trust on the understanding that 
the classroom will not purposely be used to advance religious 
views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student 
and his or her family. Students in such institutions are 
impressionable and their attendance is involuntary. The State 
exerts great authority and coercive power through mandatory  
 77. See, supra, text accompanying notes 31-32. This line of discussion is 
continued infra, notes 104–08, and accompanying text. 
 78. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
 79. Id. at 56–60. 
 80. Id. at 42. 
 81. 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
 82. Id. at 586–94. 
 83. Id. at 581. 
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attendance requirements, and because of the students’ 
emulation of teachers as role models and the children’s 
susceptibility to peer pressure.84 
 
Thus the injury to plaintiffs’ school-age children was the natural 
consequences of their status as students in the Louisiana public 
schools. It was probable that the government’s expression 
contradicted beliefs held by the students, be those beliefs 
religious or secular, but this should have been made explicit. 
Once again there was no challenge before the Supreme Court to 
plaintiffs’ standing. So we can only infer that the needed proxy 
for “injury” follows from Engel and Schempp. 
County of Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU85 involved 
challenges to two local governmental displays during the 
December holiday season. The Court struck down a nativity 
scene inside the county courthouse, and upheld an outdoor 
display of a Menorah, Christmas tree, and Liberty Banner at a 
different location jointly operated by the city and county. The 
plaintiffs challenging both displays were “the Greater Pittsburgh 
Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union and seven local 
residents” of the city and county.86 Once again the government 
did not question the plaintiffs’ standing before the High Court. 
Plaintiffs were local residents, increasing the opportunity and 
frequency for unwanted exposure, and thereby setting up a 
conflict with their local governments because plaintiffs were 
citizens of both the city and county. As with Lynch and Edwards, 
the question needed more explication by the Court. 
Lee v. Weisman87 struck down the practice of inviting clergy 
to offer prayers at a public school commencement ceremony. 
Attendance at the ceremony was voluntary, and no penalty 
attached to a student who did not attend.88 The plaintiffs 
challenging the practice were “Daniel Weisman, in his individual 
capacity as a Providence taxpayer and as [father] of Deborah,” 
and the daughter, Deborah, a student now graduated from the  
 84. Id. at 584. 
 85. 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (plurality op. in part). 
 86. Id. at 587. 
 87. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 88. Id. at 583. 
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middle school and enrolled in the high school where a similar 
prayer arrangement was conducted at its commencement.89 
Plaintiffs’ standing was questioned. Being the parent of a student 
exposed to the government’s expression, along with future 
exposure being likely, were sufficient for purposes of Daniel’s 
standing. The Court said: 
We find it unnecessary to address Daniel Weisman’s taxpayer 
standing, for a live and justiciable controversy is before us. 
Deborah Weisman is enrolled as a student at Classical High 
School in Providence and from the record it appears likely, if 
not certain, that an invocation and benediction will be 
conducted at her high school graduation.90 
Once again the voluntary nature of the ceremony, hence lack of 
compulsion, did not make any difference so long as the claim was 
brought under the Establishment Clause where coercion need not 
be shown. On the merits, the clergy-led prayer was found to be in 
violation of the Establishment Clause. 
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe91 struck down a 
public school process whereby one student was elected by fellow 
students to offer words of inspiration (with prayer as a likely 
choice) over the loudspeaker before high school football games. 
Participation by students was voluntary. The plaintiffs 
challenging the prayer were “two sets of current or former 
students and their respective mothers. One family is Mormon 
and the other is Catholic.”92 The Court does not say if the 
exercise or the prayer’s content was contrary to the faith of the 
plaintiffs. The government did not question the standing of the 
plaintiffs, but standing would seem to follow from Engel and 
Schempp. On the merits, the Court held that the school’s voting 
process leading to the prayer was in violation of the 
Establishment Clause. 
 
 89. Id. at 584. Daniel Weisman was also described as a state taxpayer. 
Paying local taxes is a matter relevant to taxpayer standing but not unwanted-
exposure standing. 
 90. Id. 
 91. 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 92. Id. at 294. 
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Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow93 concerned a 
plaintiff who was denied standing to challenge the words “under 
God” in the Pledge of Allegiance recited by public school 
students, including his daughter, at the beginning of each school 
day. The parents had never married. Although the Pledge was 
optional, both the daughter and her mother, who held ultimate 
legal custody, wished to have the daughter recite the Pledge. 
Standing was denied because the father was a noncustodial 
parent without final say in the Pledge matter. Under these 
circumstances, Newdow held that being a parent without more 
was not always sufficient to have standing.94 
Van Orden v. Perry95 upheld the constitutionality of a 
monument of the Ten Commandments, one of several 
monuments on the grounds surrounding the Texas Capitol in 
Austin. The plaintiff challenging the monument was described as 
follows: 
Thomas Van Orden is a native Texan and a resident of 
Austin. At one time he was a licensed lawyer, having 
graduated from Southern Methodist Law School. Van Orden 
testified that, since 1995, he has encountered the Ten 
Commandments monument during his frequent visits to the 
Capitol grounds. His visits are typically for the purpose of 
using the law library in the Supreme Court building, which is 
located just northwest of the Capitol building. 
Forty years after the monument’s erection and six years 
after Van Orden began to encounter the monument frequently, 
he sued . . . .96 
The government did not question Van Orden’s standing before 
the Supreme Court. As a person trained as a lawyer but without 
a law office or library of his own, as well as a citizen of Texas, 
perhaps the plaintiff was presumed to have visited public sites at 
the State Capitol and to have taken advantage of the free use of 
the state-operated law library located near the Capitol. In  
 93. 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
 94. Id. at 13–18 (no standing based on a rule of prudence rather than 
Article III limitations); see, supra, text accompanying note 37. 
 95. 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality op.). 
 96. Id. at 682. 
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walking the Capitol grounds, not only had plaintiff been 
personally exposed to the monument, but as a state citizen his 
beliefs were at odds with the state’s message. That the plaintiff 
was also a citizen of Austin would not logically figure into his 
standing.  Texas, not Austin, was the speaker. However, living in 
Austin likely increased the frequency of his exposure to the 
monument. 
McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky97 struck down 
depictions of the Ten Commandments placed in display cases 
(arrayed with other historical documents) located in two county 
courthouses in Kentucky. The plaintiffs were all too briefly 
described as “American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, et 
al.”98 The Supreme Court explained that in both counties “the 
hallway display was ‘readily visible to . . . county citizens who 
use the courthouse to conduct their civic business, to obtain or 
renew driver’s licenses and permits, to register cars, to pay local 
taxes, and to register to vote.’”99 More helpfully, a lower court 
opinion wrote that in addition to the ACLU of Kentucky, 
plaintiffs were Lawrence Durham and Paul Lee, ACLU 
members.100  From the context it appears that Durham and Lee 
were, respectively, residents of the two counties. Additionally, 
the lower court said that the state ACLU had organizational 
standing because it “has members in Pulaski County who would 
have standing for the same reason that the named plaintiffs have 
standing.”101 
The counties suggested in their trial brief that “the Ten 
Commandments were posted in order to teach Pulaski County 
residents about American religious history and the foundations  
 97. 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
 98. Id. at 852. 
 99. Id. (citation omitted). 
 100. ACLU of Ky. v. Pulaski Cnty., 96 F. Supp.2d 691 (E.D. Ky. 2000). 
 101. Id. at 694. In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 
U.S. 333, 343 (1977), the Supreme Court articulated a three-part test for when 
organizations have standing to sue on behalf of their members: (a) the members 
(or some of them) would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) 
the interests the organization seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s 
own purposes; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested 
requires participation of individual members in the lawsuit. 
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of the modern state.”102 In the federal district court the 
defendants questioned plaintiffs’ standing because they lacked 
any personalized injury.103 Having lost the issue at the trial level, 
the defendants did not raise lack of standing before the Supreme 
Court.  One can infer from McCreary County that a county citizen 
who would necessarily pass by the religious display while doing 
routine legal transactions with her county government has the 
necessary status required for unwanted-exposure standing. The 
case does not say that personal exposure to the hallway displays 
actually occurred. Rather, county residency was apparently 
sufficient given the likelihood that if personal exposure had not 
already occurred it soon would. As in Van Orden, local 
citizenship led to apparent conflict between plaintiffs’ beliefs and 
the governmental message in the two displays. After Lynch and 
County of Allegheny, that was sufficient for standing. But the 
conflict of beliefs with message should have been made explicit 
by the Court.  The state ACLU would have no standing in its own 
right. Rather, the ACLU’s organizational standing was derivative 
of that of its members by virtue of their residency in these two 
counties. 
*  *  * 
As seen in the foregoing cases, unwanted-exposure standing 
is reduced in rigor. What constitutes unwanted exposure is a 
proxy for the individuated injury otherwise required to have 
standing. Quite often individualized victims will not exist 
because exposure to unconstitutional conduct by the government, 
without more, leads only to a generalized grievance. Thus, a 
proxy is substituted for the missing injury enabling the courts to 
proceed to the merits and adjudicate these church-state claims.104 
From the foregoing sixteen cases a few reoccurring factors 
 102. ACLU of Ky., 96 F. Supp.2d at 698. 
 103. Id. at 694–95. 
 104. On the merits, individualized injury is unneeded because “coercion” is 
not required to make out a prima facie claim under the Establishment Clause. 
See, supra, notes 30 and 59–60, indicating that coercion is not required. In 
contrast, coercion is required to state a claim under the Free Exercise Clause. 
See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971) (holding taxpayers lacked the 
requisite burden on religion to pursue free exercise claim); Central Bd. of Educ. 
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248–49 (1968) (same). 
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can be identified: (1) plaintiff’s status (e.g., student, legislator, 
citizen) leads to the unwanted exposure; (2) whether the religious 
message of the plaintiff’s government is contrary to plaintiff’s 
beliefs—religious or otherwise; and (3) the frequency of the 
exposure. In the design of a proxy, the Supreme Court appears to 
have settled on a combination of the first two factors.  Even a 
proxy has to have limits.  Standing cannot become a parlor game 
where a wannabe plaintiff connects to a Skype-link on her laptop 
to view a religious display hundreds of miles away and thereby 
acquires unwanted-exposure standing. Lines have to be drawn so 
as not to require too little. 
It is remarkable that in only four out of the sixteen cases 
reviewed in this Part II was the plaintiffs’ standing questioned 
before the Supreme Court. The four cases are McCollum, 
Schempp, Marsh, and Weisman. These four involved plaintiffs 
who were public school parents, sometimes joined by their school-
age children, and a state legislator. The rule drawn from 
McCollum, Schempp, Marsh, and Weisman, and to a lesser 
degree from the other twelve cases where lack of standing could 
have been raised but was not, can be stated as follows: There is 
unwanted-exposure standing where a plaintiff’s status has led to 
being personally exposed to her government’s religious 
expression, the message being one with which she disagrees, or 
she has had to assume a burden to avoid any such exposure. 
That the government’s message countermands a belief 
(religious or otherwise) held by the plaintiff is not much 
discussed by the Court.105 The basic paradigm in these church-
state cases is that the government has unconstitutionally taken 
sides on a religious question. Accordingly, at some level there has 
to be disagreement by the plaintiff with her own government’s 
message.106 Disagreement is perhaps implicit in the fact that the  
 105. The consolidated cases in Schempp provide an example. In one case, 
plaintiffs were students that were members of churches with teachings that 
were countermanded by the school’s form of prayer and devotional Bible 
reading. 374 U.S. 203, 206, 208 (1963). In the other case, plaintiffs were 
atheists, thus it went without saying that their beliefs were at odds with the 
school’s religious exercises. Id. at 211–12. 
 106. See, supra, notes 33–34, and accompanying text. To help see that 
disagreement is necessary, consider that in theory a plaintiff could be 
indifferent to the message (or even agree) but also believe that the government 




plaintiff is suing, but the plaintiff’s beliefs that are in contention 
with her government should be openly and specifically stated. 
Going forward, there needs to be acknowledgment by the Court 
that unwanted-exposure standing is conditional on a clear 
statement that the government’s message is unwanted because it 
contradicts a serious belief held by the plaintiff—hence the 
Establishment Clause objection being that her government has 
taken sides against her in a religious matter. 
The frequency of a plaintiff’s exposure is little discussed. It is 
not a factor that the Court has said is essential to unwanted-
exposure standing, albeit frequency does get mention as a 
makeweight. In some instances, frequency or regularity of 
exposure to the government’s religious expression may be 
evidence that the plaintiff has the status required to have 
unwanted-exposure standing. Thus one would expect that a 
citizen of a municipality that sponsors a seasonal Christmas 
display will have more frequent exposure to a display on the 
lawn of the city hall than say the exposure of one who resides 
one-hundred miles away. Yet frequency of exposure is not a 
substitute for the needed status because repeated exposure can 
be contrived.  For example, in preparation for the filing of a 
lawsuit a future plaintiff could frequent a symbol so as to incur 
“lots” of exposure. On the other hand, while some personal 
exposure is assumed, repetition of the exposure may be quite 
irregular even when the plaintiff is under a legal duty that led to 
the exposure. An illustration is where plaintiff’s job 
responsibilities are the cause of the exposure to the religious 
speech. Similarly, the exposure is irregular if an employee’s job 
description requires going past the government display just once 
or twice a year. Even though irregular, there ought to be 
standing because of the plaintiff’s status as an employee whose 
job required the exposure. Also consider a plaintiff who is 
summoned for jury duty and the religious symbol must be passed 
by when jurors enter and leave the courthouse.107 The exposure  
is violating the Establishment Clause by sponsoring the message. 
 107. See, e.g., Books v. Elkhart Cnty., 401 F.3d 857, 862 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(plaintiff with standing because unwanted exposure was of a juror). 
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would be frequent for a week or two, and then drop to none at all. 
Even though irregular, this unwanted exposure while fulfilling a 
legal duty should lead to standing because of plaintiff’s status as 
a juror. What the Court seems to be trying to avoid is standing 
when the exposure is self-inflicted. 
The two factors that draw the most attention by the Court 
are personal exposure to the unwanted message and that the 
plaintiff is so situated such that she comes into contact with her 
government’s message. Although these factors can be stated 
separately, they are intertwined by the Court as one. Thus, for 
example, plaintiff has status as a county citizen and is thereby 
exposed to a religious display maintained at the local courthouse. 
A plaintiff who is not a citizen of the county but who, 
nonetheless, is exposed to the display, should be refused the 
proxy of unwanted exposure and thus have no standing. Personal 
exposure alone is insufficient. That can be self-inflicted. 
Citizenship alone is insufficient. Rather, it is the status of 
citizenship that in turn leads to the personal exposure that 
permits standing.108 It is also sensible to think that such a citizen 
suffers a palpable conflict when her local government promotes 
the religious message, whereas a non-citizen of that government 
residing fifty miles away would not. Disagreement with someone 
else’s government is insufficient. Further, standing does not turn 
on how offended or emotionally distressed plaintiff is by the 
government’s message. Such intensity of feeling will vary with 
the plaintiff and cannot be reliably measured. Keeping the proxy 
tightly defined affords some assurance that these Establishment 
Clause cases are presented in an adversarial context such that 
the best arguments are brought out in litigation and all relevant 
facts offered into evidence. 
Valley Forge is not to the contrary. It was about taxpayer 
standing, not unwanted-exposure standing. It did not involve a 
religious message by the government that was alleged by  
 108. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (citizens of two 
county governments); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (citizen of a state 
government); Cnty. of Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 
(1989) (citizens of city and county governments); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 
668 (1984) (citizen of a city government). 
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plaintiffs to be a case of taking sides on a religious question. 
Rather, Valley Forge involved a church-state objection to the 
transfer of surplus government land at no cost to a religious 
college. 
The taxpayer-plaintiffs in Valley Forge were dismissively 
said to have mere psychological injury as a result of observing 
conduct by government of which they disapproved.109 This injury 
was characterized as a generalized grievance, not anything like 
the injury required by Flast for taxpayer standing. In Valley 
Forge the federal government was being sued for its conduct—the 
transfer of surplus land to a religious college—not for 
sponsorship of a religious message. The denial of taxpayer 
standing in Valley Forge does not mean that the Court would 
reject standing by a plaintiff who was suing because his status as 
U.S. citizen was the cause of his personal exposure to an 
unwanted religious message. It would be unusual, however, for 
the status of U.S. citizenship to be the cause of such personal 
exposure. An example might be a plaintiff’s naturalization 
ceremony held at a local church which is begun with an 
invocational prayer. 
Valley Forge must not be read to confuse two things. The 
sentence referencing “psychological” disagreement with the 
government as insufficient injury was in the context of rejecting 
taxpayer standing. However, psychological disagreement—or 
 109. With respect to the alleged church-state violation observed by plaintiff, 
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., and others in Valley 
Forge, Court held: 
Although [Americans United and the other plaintiffs] claim that the 
Constitution has been violated, they claim nothing else. They fail to 
identify any personal injury suffered by them as a consequence of the 
alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence 
presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one 
disagrees. That is not an injury sufficient to confer standing under 
Art. III., even though the disagreement is phrased in constitutional 
terms. It is evident that [plaintiffs] are firmly committed to the 
constitutional principle of separation of church and State, but 
standing is not measured by the intensity of the litigant’s interest or 
the fervor of his advocacy. 
454 U.S. 464, 485–86 (1982) (holding plaintiffs lack taxpayer standing to 
challenge government plans to give surplus land to religious college). 
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something more accurately described as plaintiff’s beliefs 
conflicting with a government’s message—is a proper factor when 
it comes to unwanted-exposure standing.110 A conflict between 
belief and message is the basis of adversity between plaintiff and 
her government where the basic problem is government taking 
sides on a religious question. 
Just because an unwanted-exposure plaintiff is allowed 
standing to sue, that does not mean that she will prevail on the 
merits. In particular, care should be taken not to conflate 
unwanted-exposure standing with “no-endorsement,” the latter 
being a test that goes to the merits.111 Whether a religious 
symbol or other religious expression by the government violates 
the Establishment Clause is often a difficult assessment—one 
that goes to matters beyond whether plaintiff has the proxy of 
unwanted exposure such that she has standing to sue.112 
 110. The possibility for confusion between these two matters is illustrated 
by City of Edmond v. Robinson, 68 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 
U.S. 1201 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by Scalia and Thomas, 
JJ.).  On the merits, the circuit court held that a Latin cross on a municipal seal 
violated the Establishment Clause. Plaintiffs’ standing had not been 
challenged. As Chief Justice Rehnquist observed, the only basis for plaintiffs’ 
standing was that they were non-Christians living and working in the city. Id. 
at 1202. Three Justices would have granted certiorari on the question of 
standing. With reference to the Valley Forge passage on “psychological” injury, 
the Chief Justice said that “[m]ere presence in the city, without further 
allegations as to injury, quite clearly fails to meet the standing requirements” of 
the Court’s cases. Id. That is unquestionably true, but not a full account of the 
facts. When the case is one of unwanted exposure, and the plaintiffs have shown 
both that as non-Christians their beliefs conflict with the message and that 
they are citizens of the municipality and thereby in disagreement with their 
own government, then there would be standing. See, supra, text accompanying 
notes 105–06. 
 111. Steven Smith suggests that relaxed standing is attributable to the 
Court’s use of the endorsement test. Smith, supra note 3, at 439–40. However, 
the advent of the endorsement test was in Lynch (1984), whereas unwanted-
exposure standing started at least as early as Engel (1962) and Schempp (1963). 
 112. Compare Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680–85, and Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 
783, 793–94 (1983) (finding that the government’s religious message did not 
violate the Establishment Clause), with McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 869–74, 
and Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 373 U.S. 203, 224–25 (1963) 
(finding that the government’s religious message did violate the Establishment 
Clause). 
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Here I utilize the factual record in Salazar v. Buono113 to 
illustrate some features of unwanted-exposure standing and to 
test its boundaries. The underlying claim in Salazar was that a 
Latin cross in a national land preserve was allowed to remain 
after the cross’s presence was called to the government’s 
attention, all in violation of the Establishment Clause. Although 
lack of unwanted-exposure standing was raised before the 
Supreme Court, the government was bound to a finding of 
standing in the lower courts because it had not been timely 
appealed.114 But that does not prevent the interesting facts of 
Salazar from being a helpful illustration. 
In 1934, the Veterans of Foreign Wars erected a Latin cross 
on a location known as Sunrise Rock in the Mojave Desert in 
southeastern California.115 This had not been authorized by the 
federal government, who owned the property. The cross was a 
memorial to members of the armed forces who died in the Great 
World War. In 1994, the land where the cross is located became 
part of the Mojave National Preserve, which is administered by 
the National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior. The 
Mojave National Preserve consists of 1.6 million acres of federal 
land in the Mojave Desert, with 86,600 acres of private land 
within its boundaries. 
The plaintiff, Frank Buono, filed his lawsuit in March 2001 
seeking a declaration that the Latin cross on government land 
violated the Establishment Clause, as well as an injunction 
ordering the cross’s removal. Buono was a retired employee of the 
National Park Service residing in Oregon.  He had retired four 
years earlier in 1997. When employed by the Park Service Buono 
had been assigned to the Mojave Preserve from January 22, 1995 
to December 10, 1995. It was during this eleven-month period 
that Buono learned of the Latin cross and visited the site at 
 113. 559 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (plurality op.). 
 114. 130 S. Ct. at 1814–15 (during the first appeal the court of appeals 
concluded that there was standing and that holding is now binding on the 
government as a matter of preclusion). 
 115. The facts recited here are from uncontested findings of the district 
court. See Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp.2d 1202, 1204–07 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
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Sunrise Rock. Buono first became troubled when there was a 
request to erect a Buddhist stupa near the cross.116 The request 
was denied by Buono’s superiors. At the time Buono believed it 
was wrong for the cross to remain while similar access was 
denied for the stupa. 
Although now retired and living in Oregon, Buono retained 
an active interest in the Mojave National Preserve and visited 
two to four times per year. When visiting the Preserve, Buono 
had taken to avoiding Sunrise Rock so as not to be re-exposed to 
the cross, such avoidance being, in his view, a government-added 
burden because it meant not using Cima Road. One can see the 
Latin cross from the highway where Cima Road passes by 
Sunrise Rock. Cima Road is the most convenient road for 
accessing other areas of interest within the Preserve. 
Buono is a Roman Catholic but testified that he did not find 
the Latin cross religiously injurious. Rather, he said that he 
objected in two respects: (i) the cross remained at Sunrise Rock 
while access was denied to similar displays such as the Buddhist 
stupa; and (ii) when the National Park Service failed to remove 
the cross (understood as a symbol of Christianity) from 
government land there was an ongoing failure to properly 
separate church and state. 
The lower federal courts held that Buono had personalized 
injury such that he had standing to bring his claim alleging a 
violation of the Establishment Clause. The federal district court 
wrote: 
Buono is deeply offended by the cross display on public land in 
an area that is not open to others to put up whatever symbols 
they choose. A practicing Roman Catholic, Buono does not find 
the cross itself objectionable, but stated that the presence of 
the cross is objectionable to him as a religious symbol because 
it rests on federal land.117 
First quoting with approval this passage by the district court, as 
well as taking note of Buono’s recent avoidance of Cima Road, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals went on to observe that: 
 
 116. A stupa is a mound-like structure containing Buddhist relics. 
 117. Buono, 212 F. Supp.2d at 1207. 
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW [Volume 7 
640 
Buono is, in other words, unable to “freely us[e]” the area of the 
Preserve around the cross because of the government’s 
allegedly unconstitutional actions. . . .  We have repeatedly 
held that inability to unreservedly use public land suffices as 
injury-in-fact. . . . Such inhibition constitutes “personal injury 
suffered . . . as a consequence of the alleged constitutional 
error,” beyond simply “the psychological consequence 
presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one 
disagrees.”118 
 
Buono testified that as a Catholic he suffered no religious injury 
at seeing the cross. He did not claim that the cross was contrary 
to Catholic teaching.119 Nor did he claim that the Latin cross, as 
a symbol of Christianity, was debased through its appropriation 
by the government for patriotic purposes.120 That left two 
possibilities for Buono’s injury-in-fact: (1) harm because others 
cannot erect their symbols in the same general area where the  
 118. Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 547 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). 
Subsequent proceedings involving the merits of the Establishment Clause claim 
appear at Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp.2d 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2005), and Buono v. 
Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 119. It is not essential for unwanted-exposure standing that the 
government’s religious message be in conflict with a religious belief of Buono. 
See, supra, notes 105–06 and accompanying text. But it is essential that there 
be some sort of conflict with Buono’s beliefs whether secular or religious, 
because the paradigm here is government unconstitutionally taking sides on a 
religious matter. 
 120. As discussed in the text accompanying notes 33–34, supra, the heart of 
the Establishment Clause violation here is government taking sides in a 
religious matter. The third of the three ways in which government can take 
sides is where an individual’s religion is harmed by too close an embrace of her 
religion by the government. This can take the form of the government 
appropriating religious symbols and employing them to legitimate actions of the 
State or simply to unify the people behind the State. But for religion to be used 
in this way will ultimately harm plaintiff’s religion. This corrupts religion, as 
many statesmen such as James Madison noted during the founding period. See, 
supra, note 32 (citing to arguments by Madison). And such corruption has been 
noted by Justices on the Supreme Court as one of the harms to be prevented by 
the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 725 (1984) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting how government’s use of Christmas nativity 
scene “mut[es] the religious content”); id. at 727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(“The crèche has been relegated to the role of a neutral harbinger of the holiday 
season, useful for commercial purposes, but devoid of any inherent meaning and 
incapable of enhancing the religious tenor of a display of which it is an integral 
part. The city has its victory—but it is a Pyrrhic one indeed.”). 
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cross is located; and (2) harm that the cross, understood as a 
Christian symbol, stands on government property contrary to 
Buono’s beliefs concerning the demands of church-state 
separation. From the Ninth Circuit’s statement quoted above, the 
circuit court—while noting both of these two harms as Buono’s 
injury-in-fact so as to have standing—relied principally on the 
second. Moreover, the circuit court found this harm sufficiently 
weighty such that Buono had taken the step of avoiding Cima 
Road and thereby incurring additional travel burdens as he 
explored the Mojave National Preserve. 
Buono lacks third-party standing to complain that others are 
denied access to Sunrise Rock such that they might erect their 
own symbols.121 For example, to the extent that Buono alleged 
harm on behalf of the Buddhist who sought to erect a stupa, that 
is a third-party claim for which Buono lacks standing.122 
Buono’s church-state claim of injury-in-fact is more involved. 
Buono’s alleged injuries were: (1) unwanted exposure to the cross 
because of the government’s failure to meet its duty of church-
state separation which required, in his view, removal of the cross 
from government land; and (2) self-restricted use of Cima Road to 
avoid his being re-exposed to the cross each time he travels by 
Sunrise Rock. The first allegation is a generalized grievance like 
that of any individual who is disappointed by his nation’s lack of 
vigilance in rooting out church-state violations.  Buono alleged 
that there was a violation of the Establishment Clause, but he 
alleged nothing else. Adding that he was “deeply offended,” 
without more, changes nothing.  And Buono’s second allegation of 
injury-in-fact was one of self-restricted use of Cima Road because 
of his alleged harm in viewing the cross.  The second alleged  
 121. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 510 (1975) (summarizing those 
limited instances when third-party standing is permitted, none of which apply 
here). 
 122. Such an averment attempts to state a free speech claim that equal 
access is being denied in a limited public forum, not a claim under the 
Establishment Clause about religious speech attributable to the government. 
Cf. City of Pleasant Grove, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009). The 
government declining access for the stupa likely had nothing to do with its 
symbolic message. Given that this was a land preserve, it is likely that the 
National Park Service sought to not create a public forum of any sort. 
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harm (avoiding exposure) thereby logically collapses into the first 
(actual exposure).123 
Buono’s circumstances were different from that of the 
parents and their school-age children exposed to unwanted 
prayer and devotional Bible reading in Abington School District 
v. Schempp:124 
“The parties [in Schempp] are school children and their 
parents, who are directly affected by the laws and practices 
against which their complaints are directed.” . . . .The plaintiffs 
in Schempp had standing, not because their complaint rested 
on the Establishment Clause—for as Doremus [v. Board of 
Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952)] demonstrated, that is 
insufficient—but because impressionable schoolchildren were 
subject to unwelcome religious exercises or were forced to 
assume special burdens to avoid them.125 
The students suffered more than being deeply offended by what 
they believed to be a violation of the Establishment Clause. The 
Supreme Court’s unwanted-exposure precedents require that 
plaintiffs’ status causes them to be personally exposed to the 
religious expression of the offending government, or else forced to 
assume a special burden to avoid such exposure. In Schempp, the 
plaintiffs’ circumstance of compulsory school attendance was 
such that their status as students brought them into personal 
exposure to the unwelcomed prayer and biblical devotions, or else 
forced them to assume special burdens to avoid the exercises. 
Buono’s claim of an ongoing injury was that he would suffer 
unwanted exposure if he traveled to observe the cross, or he was 
“forced to assume special burdens to avoid” being re-exposed to 
what he deemed a church-state violation. However, Buono’s 
status did not subject him to personal exposure to the cross. He 
was a retired employee of the National Park Service residing in 
 123. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1151 
(2013) (plaintiffs’ contention that they have standing because they proceeded to 
incur certain costs in response to the risk of harm was unavailing because the 
underlying risk was speculative as well as self-inflicted). 
 124. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
 125. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & 
State, 454 U.S. 464, 487 n. 22 (1982). 
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Oregon. Buono’s frequent visits to the Preserve were at his own 
free will. It would be different if Buono were currently employed 
by the Park Service and his job duties required that he travel 
Cima Road past Sunrise Rock. Buono was no doubt sincere in his 
being aggrieved that the federal government was violating the 
Establishment Clause. But this was a mere generalized 
grievance. 
Frank Buono’s status does not fit the Supreme Court’s proxy 
for unwanted-exposure cases.  He had no responsibilities or 
rights as a local or state citizen, such as in McCreary County and 
Van Orden, causing him to visit Sunrise Rock. If we assume 
Buono was a U.S. citizen that too would be of no avail as nothing 
about his federal citizenship caused him to visit the Latin cross.  
He held no status as a student, like in Schempp, which required 
his presence at the site of the Latin cross, nor was he like the 
legislator in Marsh needing to be present in chambers to properly 
perform the duties of his elected office. Assuming Buono paid the 
admission fee to enter the Mojave National Preserve, certainly he 
had a legal right to be present at Sunrise Rock, but his presence 
there was not a legal duty. Any exposure to the cross would be 
self-inflicted. 
Buono’s circumstance is different only in degree from that of 
a citizen of the Peoples’ Republic of China who, as a resident 
alien with a five-year visa to reside and attend university in 
Massachusetts, takes a road trip to southeastern California and 
pays the admission fee to enter the Mojave Preserve and happens 
to see the Latin cross from his automobile as he drives by Sunrise 
Rock. This is one of those instances where if Buono has Article 
III standing, then the entire population of people within the 
jurisdiction of the United States (citizen or alien) has standing 
based on a chance exposure to the cross during an automobile 
ride. That would make the unwanted-exposure proxy require 
personal exposure and nothing more. None of the Court’s sixteen 
cases set out in Part II are nearly so expansive. 
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IV.  THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AS A STRUCTURAL 
RESTRAINT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR REDUCED-RIGOR 
STANDING 
In cases involving unwanted exposure to religious symbols or 
other religious speech fairly attributable to the government, we 
have seen that plaintiffs often fail to meet the usual “case” or 
“controversy” requirements for standing. In such cases—as well 
as cases involving taxpayer standing—the Supreme Court has 
allowed reduced-rigor standing so as to ease the path to reaching 
the merits.126 Why has it done so? 
The Court’s modern view of the Establishment Clause was 
instituted sixty-six years ago with its decision in Everson v. 
Board of Education of the Township of Ewing.127 Because both 
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses are pro-religious 
freedom,128 the question arose as to how the two clauses were to 
 126. Sometimes a claimant under the Establishment Clause does have 
individualized injury that meets all of the normal requirements for standing.  
But this is the exception, not the rule. These personalized harms run from 
economic loss, to inability to qualify for public office, to restrictions on academic 
inquiry. Consider the department store in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 
472 U.S. 703, 707 (1985) (increased employment regulation resulting in 
economic harm), the tavern in Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 118 
(1982) (denial of a liquor license resulting in economic harm), the public school 
teacher desirous of expanding the science curriculum in Epperson v. Arkansas, 
393 U.S. 97, 100 (1968) (hindrances to academic inquiry resulting in criminal 
charges and loss of job as injury), the forced taking of a theistic oath by a 
freethinking atheist in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (inability to 
qualify for public office as injury), shuttering one’s business on Sunday in 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 422, 430–31(1961) (economic harm to 
retail stores and criminal fines imposed on their employees), and closing one’s 
retail store on Sunday in Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 
366 U.S. 582, 592 (1961) (lost business as economic harm). 
 127. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Everson incorporated the Establishment Clause 
making it applicable to state and local governments. Id. at 14–15. 
 128. Just like the First Amendment is pro-freedom of speech and pro-
freedom of the press, the First Amendment is also pro-freedom of religion. 
However, being pro-freedom of religious is markedly different from being pro-
religion. The latter is prohibited by the modern Establishment Clause, thereby 
maintaining the requisite government neutrality. But the First Amendment is 
pro-religious freedom. Moreover, this is as true of the Establishment Clause as 
it is of the Free Exercise Clause. While commonplace to some, others will be 
surprised to have the Establishment Clause portrayed as pro-religious freedom. 
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be distinguished. The Court’s answer came fifteen years later in 
Engel v. Vitale129 and was reaffirmed a year later in School 
District of Abington Township v. Schempp.130 As the Engel Court 
said: 
Although these two clauses may in certain instances overlap, 
they forbid two quite different kinds of governmental 
encroachment upon religious freedom. The Establishment 
Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon 
any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated 
by the enactment of laws which establish any official religion 
whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving 
individuals or not.131 
The Court went on to explain that the reason coercion is not 
an element of a prima facie claim is that the Establishment 
Clause is first and foremost about the separation of church and 
state.132 Disestablishment deregulated religion, to the dual 
purpose of protecting both church and state.133 Separation 
between these two centers of authority is not due to any hostility 
to religion. Rather, it is to protect both the autonomy of the 
They mistakenly think the Religion Clauses at odds.  For discussion as to why it 
is impossible for the two clauses to be in tension, see Carl H. Esbeck, “Play in 
the Joints between The Religion Clauses” and Other Supreme Court Catachreses, 
34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1331 (2006). 
 129. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 130. 374 U.S. 203, 221, 223 (1963). 
 131. 370 U.S. at 430. 
 132. Id. at 425–36. 
 133. See, e.g., id. at 421, 431–35 (1962), where the Court said: 
[The Establishment Clause’s] first and most immediate purpose 
rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to 
destroy government and to degrade religion. . . . The Establishment 
Clause thus stands as an expression of principle on the part of the 
Founders of our Constitution that religion is too personal, too sacred, 
too holy, to permit its ‘“unhallowed perversion” by a civil magistrate. 
        . . . . 
. . . These men knew that the First Amendment, which tried to put an 
end to governmental control of religion and of prayer, was not written 
to destroy either. . . . It is neither sacrilegious nor anti-religious to say 
that each separate government in this country should stay out of the 
business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that 
purely religious function to the people themselves and to those the 
people choose to look to for religious guidance. 
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churches and to prevent division within the body politic that 
comes from government taking sides on a religious question. 
It thus developed in the post-Everson Court that the Free 
Exercise Clause was confined to addressing those situations 
where a religious practice or observance had come under state 
coercion. Without evidence of coercion, the free exercise claim 
failed on the merits.134 As such, the Free Exercise Clause is a 
rights-based claim. It runs in favor of religious individuals, 
including any religious groups that they might form.135 
The Establishment Clause operates quite differently. It runs 
against the government, limiting sovereign power over certain 
subject matters, namely, “law[s] respecting an establishment of 
religion.”136 An individual claimant need not show religious harm 
or personalized injury to win a claim under the Establishment 
Clause.137 This came about because—unlike free exercise which 
is rights-based—the Court’s modern Establishment Clause is 
about setting apart a separate sphere for religious autonomy.138  
 134. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 320 (1980) (free exercise claim 
failed because there was no showing of compulsion of religious belief); Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1973) (plurality op.) (coercion required to state 
free exercise claim); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248–49 (1968) (same). 
 135. To state a claim that involved coercion with respect to a religious 
practice did not mean that every free exercise claim would be successful. And 
after the decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), fewer 
free exercise claims do succeed. 
 136. See Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural 
Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1998). A more summary 
statement of the evidence that this Court has applied the Establishment Clause 
as if it were structural in nature, as well as how such a view explains not only 
this Court’s special standing rules with respect to no-establishment but other 
validations as well, see Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a 
Structural Restraint: Validations and Ramifications, 18 J. OF L. & POLITICS 445, 
453–71 (2002). 
 137. See, supra, notes 30, 59–60. 
 138. Borrowing from Justice Frankfurter, Justice Brennan in dissent 
describes the restraint on governmental power imposed by the Establishment 
Clause in this manner: 
[T]he Establishment Clause “withdr[aws] from the sphere of 
legitimate legislative concern and competence a specific, but 
comprehensive area of human conduct:  man’s belief or disbelief in the 
verity of some transcendental idea and man’s expression in action of 
that belief or disbelief.” That the Constitution sets this realm of 
thought and feeling apart from the pressures and antagonisms of 
government is one of it supreme achievements. 




When that desired boundary between church and state has been 
crossed, the harm or injury might be religious or it might be 
nonreligious. As the Supreme Court said in McGowan v. 
Maryland:139 
If the purpose of the “establishment” clause was only to insure 
protection for the “free exercise” of religion, then what we have 
said above concerning appellants’ standing to raise the “free 
exercise” contention would appear to be true here. However, 
the writings of Madison, who was the First Amendment’s 
architect, demonstrate that the establishment of a religion was 
equally feared because of its tendencies to political tyranny and 
subversion of civil authority.140 
For the state to improperly support or advance religion can 
result in harm other than religious harm, e.g., the loss in 
McGowan was economic.141 Indeed, a church-state violation can 
result in instances where no one has individualized injury and 
hence no one has conventional standing to sue. This will look 
much like a generalized grievance where there is no standing.142 
 The modern Supreme Court’s work to keep these two centers 
of authority, church and state, rightly ordered has caused the 
Establishment Clause to operate in many respects like the 
structural clauses of the Constitution which separate the powers 
of the three federal branches. Just as some violations of 
separation of powers can occur with no one being personally 
harmed, much the same occurs when there is a putative violation 
of the modern Establishment Clause but no one with injury-in- 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 726 (1984) (quoting from McGowan v. 
Maryland). 
 139. 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
 140. Id. at 430. 
 141. See, supra, note 126 (collecting Establishment Clause cases where the 
individualized injury was other than religious harm). 
 142. A trio of “generalized grievances” cases is represented by Schlesinger v. 
Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (plaintiff states a 
colorable violation of structural clause in the Constitution but no one with 
individualized injury, hence no one has standing to sue), United States v. 
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (same), and Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 
(1937) (per curiam) (same). 
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fact. The archetypal case before the Court was Flast v. Cohen,143 
and the Court responded by permitting limited federal taxpayer 
standing. The proxy of taxpayer with injury-in-fact permitted the 
post-Flast Court to reach the merits of some no-establishment 
claims that would otherwise be nonjusticiable because no one had 
the individuated injury to acquire standing. That line of cases 
has evolved to Hein and Winn.144 
The other line of these cases is where plaintiffs claim injury 
due to unwanted exposure to religious speech by government, but 
who do not suffer the coercion that would normally be associated 
with the individualized injury required for standing. Early on, as 
we saw in Part II, the most common case was a public school 
student exposed to voluntary religion classes, prayer, or biblical 
devotions. Because the exposure was voluntary, there was no 
coercion (which should not be mistaken with peer pressure) and 
hence no free exercise claim. The Court’s response was to reduce 
the rigor of the injury-in-fact to allow standing to sue so long as 
the plaintiff invoked the Establishment Clause. Like Flast, this 
necessarily required a proxy for the missing injury. As shown by 
the cases in Part II, the Court has required a plaintiff with a 
status that led to her personal exposure to the message with 
which she disagrees. That included not just students and 
legislators, but also citizens suing their local municipality or 
county. In both the instance of taxpayer and of unwanted-
exposure standing, creating a proxy for the needed “injury” 
permitted the Supreme Court to reach the merits of an 
Establishment Clause claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Since handing down its first unwanted-exposure decision in 
McCollum in 1948, the Supreme Court has continued to permit 
reduced rigor in the injury-in-fact requirement for standing. 
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs in these cases do need to be attentive 
to two matters. First, plaintiffs need to clearly state their beliefs,  
 143. 392 U.S. 83 (1968); see text accompanying notes 8–10, supra 
(discussing Flast). 
 144. See text accompanying notes 13–30, supra (discussing Hein and Winn). 
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religious or otherwise, that are in disagreement with the 
government’s religious message. It is not the intensity of the 
plaintiffs’ “offense” or the degree of “psychological” upset.145 It is 
sufficient to show a mere disagreement between plaintiffs’ beliefs 
and the government’s message. At bottom, these church-state 
cases are about the government taking sides on a religious 
matter, and plaintiffs’ injury is that she and her government 
have a different view on the religious matter. 
Second, the government must have caused the alleged 
constitutional wrongdoing. Plaintiffs thus must hold a status 
which led to exposure to the government’s religious message. 
Exposure without more is insufficient, as is a high frequency of 
exposure. Such a status is easy to grasp when it involves 
students in a public school, as well as with respect to jurors and 
public employees who have legal duties that result in the 
unwanted exposure. The government as causative agent of the 
wrong can become confused when plaintiffs’ status entails 
citizenship. To date there are no cases in the High Court where 
U.S. citizenship has led to unwanted-exposure standing. There 
are several cases, however, where being a citizen of a local 
municipality or county has led to standing, provided that 
plaintiff’s citizenship is in the local government that is the source 
of the unwanted religious message. A citizen of a nearby 
municipality or county does not have an adversarial relationship 
with the defendant-government. Thus the plaintiff is adverse 
only when it is her own city or county that has caused the 
message. 
The “injury” in these unwanted-exposure cases is nearly non-
Hohfeldian.146 There is no tort, no breach of contract or economic  
 145. See, Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of 
Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 486 (1982) (“It is evident that [plaintiffs] are 
firmly committed to the constitutional principle of separation of church and 
State, but standing is not measured by the intensity of the litigant’s interest or 
the fervor of his advocacy.”). 
 146. Claims that are not personal to an individual or association of 
individuals are referred to as non-Hohfeldian. See, e.g., Flast, 392 U.S. at 119 n. 
5 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The term comes from a venerable article setting forth 
several types of legal rights. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). 
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loss, no injury to real or personal property. There is no violation 
of a statutory or constitutional right. There is, however, 
disagreement over the content of the message. There is also a  
putative violation of the Establishment Clause, which is regarded 
by the Court not as rights-based, but like a structural violation of 
the Constitution. The Establishment Clause negates any 
jurisdiction of the government in “mak[ing] . . . law respecting an 
establishment of religion.” When this desired boundary between 
church and state becomes in some respect crossed, there is often 
no one with individualized injury, hence, no individual with the 
injury-in-fact to have traditional standing. 
At this juncture, the Supreme Court faced a decision. It could 
have said that because of the absence of a case or controversy in 
the conventional sense, there was no standing under Article III of 
the U.S. Constitution. That path would have led to under-
enforcement of the Establishment Clause.147 First in McCollum, 
and later in Engel, Schempp, and so on, the Supreme Court took 
a different path. It created a proxy for injury-in-fact and thereby 
allowed the civil courts to reach the merits in these unwanted-
exposure lawsuits. A roughly parallel path was taken by the 
Court with respect to taxpayer standing.  The rest is sixty-six 
years of history, from McCollum to Schempp and Marsh to 
Weisman with respect to unwanted-exposure standing, and from 
Flast to Winn with respect to taxpayer standing. It remains to be 
seen if the Supreme Court attempts to retreat from unwanted-
exposure standing, as it has with taxpayer standing. At present, 
no push in that direction has caught on in the federal courts. Any 
forthcoming cutback in reduced-rigor standing would mean that 
no-establishment principles will go unexamined or under-
enforced. That prospect ought to be received with some concern 
because the principles of church-state separation protect religion 
from being exploited in service of the government’s own 
ambitions. The political branches will sometimes use religion in a 
 147. It must be acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s reduced-rigor 
standing is in tension with another of the Court’s oft-repeated teachings, 
namely, under the assumption that if plaintiffs have no standing to sue, no one 
would have standing, is not a reason to find standing. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l 
USA, 568 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1154 (2013) (collecting cases). 
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manner that mixes God and Country,148 and that cannot but 
compromise religion and debase its symbols. 
 
 148. Conservative Christians can be their own enemy with respect to public 
symbols “because their habits have so led them to confuse America with God’s 
salvation.” STANLEY HAUERWAS, IN GOOD COMPANY: THE CHURCH AS POLIS 55-56 
(1997). 
